The Chair: It’s my understanding that after round two there would be unanimous consent.

Would that be the case, Mme LeBlanc?

Hélène LeBlanc: We have many questions to ask.

The Chair: It has to be unanimous. No consent.

Dan Harris: Maybe ask again after the second round.

The Chair: Maybe we’ll ask again.

I’ll be glad to ask as many times as you allow me.

Elizabeth May: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to members of the committee for allowing me a chance to ask questions.

Do I have five-minute time limit, Mr. Chair?

The Chair: Five minutes, that’s correct, Ms. May.

Hélène LeBlanc: Mr. Chair, can we make sure that the time allocated for the opposition is not used for this and that we would still have our time to ….

The Chair: That’s correct.

Hélène LeBlanc: Thank you very much.

The Chair: That said, that means I’ll have to stick very tight now to the five minutes. So for the questioners and the answerers I’m going to have to stick a lot tighter because we only have 27 minutes left.

Hon. Mike Lake: Just to clarify, where are we with questions?

The Chair: After Ms. May is done, then we’ll go to our third round. It will be Conservative, NDP, Conservative, Liberal.

Ms. May.

Elizabeth May: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’ll attempt to use my time efficiently. Thank you witnesses.

I want to go back to the competition policy review panel and their advice before the amendments were tabled in 2009. I’m really going to ask questions specifically around the fact that these amendments through Bill C-60are attempting as I see it to bring greater clarity around certain concepts and to extend timelines for national security reviews.

What I want to know is if whether within Industry Canada, whether you received advice that it would be helpful to review and clarify the term national security which currently isn’t defined within the act?

Paul Halucha: It’s been something that has been mentioned by I would say think tanks and certain legal firms that represent foreign investors. Again in their efforts to have maximum certainty, they wanted to have a prescribed definition of it or a list the way that some other countries do like the United States.

Elizabeth May: Yes, I think the United States, the U.K., China, Japan and Germany that would have reviews that would be triggered by an actually defined term of national security.

What I’m wondering is whether Industry Canada, whether you’re aware of any studies in the Canadian context that, as you said think tanks have recommended this. It’s in the Canada Gazette from when the 2009 amendments were accepted that there were recommendations at the time that the term national security should be “explicitly defined and national security reviews should take place according to concrete objective and transparent criteria”.

Are you aware of any empirically design studies that would in any way question the benefit of having such defined terms and such transparent reviews?

Paul Halucha: I’m not. We don’t have any studies on that. I’d clarify, it was a policy decision by the government to not have a prescribed definition for national security on the basis that the types of threats that Canada could face from period to period can change. Given the evolving nature of threats, you wouldn’t want to have a definition of national security that precluded you from considering certain specific types of threats.

Elizabeth May: But you’d agree with me that other countries haven’t found a defined term to be an impediment to applying their investment tests in relation to national security.

Matthew Dooley: I would point that the United States, as a clear example, has an non-exhaustive list—it’s exhaustive in that it’s very long, but it’s non-exhaustive in that they can add more to it if they want to. I would argue that they don’t have a clearly defined definition for “this is national security”. What they have done is list their sensitive industries or sectors that they’re going to be concerned about and by the way if another sector comes up, as Mr. Halucha said, the threats change and they’ll add that to the list.

Elizabeth May: Yes, Mr. Dooley, you may find their list exhausting but it’s not exhaustive. In any case, it might be a model we can look at.

Those are all of my questions. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. May.

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Attention should be paid to the fact that the Prime Minister has signed a deal with President Hu of China that promises investor protection. The text of said deal is not yet before the House of Commons, but everything I read about it (including from business analysts at Heenan Blaikie and Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt) anticipates the deal will include investor-state provisions similar to those in Chapter 11 of NAFTA.

Chapter 11 of NAFTA allows corporations from Mexico or the USA to claim damages against Canada if any level of Canadian government (municipal, provincial or federal) causes them to experience less profits than they had anticipated. Canada has actually repealed a law limiting a toxic gasoline additive when the US-based manufacturer sued under Chapter 11 — and we paid $10 million plus in damages. This outrage only gets more outrageous if the claims for multiple millions in damages come from a non-democratic enormous economy to which we have hitched our wagon as a compliant resource colony.

When will Mr. Harper share the text of this investor agreement with Parliamentarians? When will it be shared with Canadians? It was signed on September 8th when both Harper and Hu were in Russia. It must now be ratified. Assuming all the Conservative MPs who are worried about selling out our country to China do what they always do and submit to the will of the Boss, it will become a trade obligation. China will, if offended by any new health, labour, or environmental law, be able to make a claim for damages. I have already witnessed the chilling effect of Canada knowing a US based corporation can sue under Chapter 11. It was rumoured that former Liberal Health Minister Allan Rock refused to ban cosmetic use of pesticides for fear of Chapter 11 claims by US pesticide manufacturers.

What happens when Canadian laws, passed democratically, are struck down in hotel room arbitrations launched by the Communist Party of China?

I pay attention to things that CNOOC’s CEO says in public. In the August 29, 2012, Wall Street Journal, CNOOC CEO Wang Yilin said, “Large-scale deep-water rigs are our mobile national territory and a strategic weapon.” OK, so the bitumen isn’t mobile – until you mix it with diluents and stick it in a pipeline. But the oil sands do become Chinese territory. What did he mean about “strategic weapon?”

Are there national security implications?

I would love to trust in a national security review under the 2009 amendments to the Investment Canada Act, except that Stephen Harper specifically rejected the advice of the blue ribbon panel (struck after the Minmetal attempt to buy Noranda) that Canada needed a clear, objective definition of “national security.” The experts thought we should have a definition and use it to assess any takeovers of Canadian companies by foreign interests — particularly state-owned enterprises. Our PM rejected the advice. Instead the Canada Gazette for the 2009 amendments says that “national security” cannot be defined. It is, apparently, a fluid term.

Smart people I respect, like Andrew Coyne, say “don’t worry — there’s no national security threat when you cannot take the resource out of the country.” But then I run into stories like this:

Beijing hints at bond attack on Japan

Jin Baisong from the Chinese Academy of International Trade – a branch of the commerce ministry – said China should use its power as Japan’s biggest creditor with $230bn (£141bn) of bonds to “impose sanctions on Japan in the most effective manner” and bring Tokyo’s festering fiscal crisis to a head.

Writing in the Communist Party newspaper China Daily, Mr. Jin called on China to invoke the “security exception” rule under the World Trade Organisation to punish Japan, rejecting arguments that a trade war between the two Pacific giants would be mutually destructive.

Separately, the Hong Kong Economic Journal reported that China is drawing up plans to cut off Japan’s supplies of rare earth metals needed for hi-tech industry.

– The Telegraph, September 19, 2012

OK, maybe he’s just threatening to destroy Japan’s economy. Maybe he doesn’t mean it. Maybe the WTO wouldn’t let him do it…. but then there was the Sino-Forest fraud, busted by the Ontario Securities Commission:

OSC puts the spotlight on Sino-Forest gatekeepers

In its allegations Tuesday, the OSC noted that auditors Ernst & Young “were not made aware” of Sino-Forest’s “systemic practice of creating deceitful purchase contracts and sales contracts.” The commission makes no further comment on the audit firm’s work. A spokeswoman for Ernst & Young could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

The OSC issued a report in March calling on boards, underwriters, auditors and stock exchanges to improve the practices for listing foreign companies on Canadian stock exchanges, saying there has been a broad lack of “skepticism” about business practices in emerging companies like China.

– Globe and Mail, May 22, 2012

There’s a beautiful term: “broad lack of skepticism.”

It makes me nervous that Chinese companies are merely branches of the Chinese government. The Communist Party hierarchy appoints the boards of directors of CNOOC, Sinopec and Petro-China.

When I read in the business pages that Petro-China wants to bid on construction of the Enbridge pipeline, and read in the same story that Chinese companies are very competitive in their bids because of low labour costs, I picture the labourers who built the national dream of Pierre Berton’s imaginings… with a brutal and nasty history. We have a temporary foreign workers programme. It could happen. And the bitumen going through the proposed pipeline is to go to Chinese supertankers to Chinese refineries.

All this makes me nervous. It makes me nervous in two quite contradictory ways. Firstly, I am a tolerant small “l” liberal type of person. I am not Sino-phobic. China is not a country one can ignore. In terms of global climate negotiations, China’s engagement is essential. China has been, at least at COP17, far more progressive than Canada in talking about the need for a global climate deal.

I want greater ties with China for environmental endeavors, and cultural exchanges, and — yes – trade too. Losing sovereignty to China makes me nervous. I don’t want to be intolerant. But I want us to trade items made in Canada, by Canadians, to China. I don’t like the idea of China owning Canada. It makes it hard for us to point out to the Chinese government that it must start respecting human rights. We need to be really forceful in advocating for religious and political freedom in China. How do we do that when they have veto power over Canadian laws?

And then there are issues of global tensions. Mr. Harper and John Baird are talking tough to Iran. But what about the fact that, while we claim we are exerting sanctions on anyone doing business with Iran, Sinopec, now a major stake-holder in Syncrude, is Iran’s number one customer for oil? Or, that Chinese oil money helps prop up Bashar al-Assad?

So, bottom-line, the Nexen-CNOOC deal doesn’t have me nearly as freaked out as the investor deal Stephen Harper signed in Russia. But when I think about the idea of “net benefit” I just don’t see any answer but “no.”

The post Why I think we are absolute idiots if we approve CNOOC take-over of Nexen appeared first on Elizabeth May.

All negotiations with other countries are over before the bills get here. The Prime Minister is making announcements about a free trade agreement with China, and another one with Japan.

What does he think the role of members is when free trade agreements are signed before they can be debated here?

Hoang Mai: Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the leader of the Green Party for her question.

I agree with her that this government is not entirely transparent and often presents us with a fait accompli. We see this in virtually every regard.

When we want to debate, it gags us, and when we want to talk about something as fundamental as a free trade agreement, it presents us with a fait accompli. And when we propose amendments, it rejects them. There has been no real public debate about this. None of the groups that work to protect the environment or to protect workers’ rights have been heard.

The real role of the government and the House is to discuss and debate all the issues from various angles. Unfortunately, this government is very much lacking in transparency.

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Order in Council 1486 was passed on February 24, 1942, authorizing that all “persons of Japanese racial origin” be systematically removed from an area along the BC coast.  Many ended up separated from family in internment camps.  More than 20,000 Japanese Canadians were affected.

This event was part of a longer-term effort against Japanese Canadians during the timeframe of WWII, including labelling them as “enemy aliens” and stripping them of their civil rights.  The RCMP was able to search Japanese homes and seize possessions without a warrant. Japanese Canadians were forced to carry an identification card and subjected to curfews.

“There is greater danger in targeting people based on their ethnicity rather than examining any real threat to national security.  We must continue to take care that government actions are not racially motivated.  It is vital that civil liberties be preserved for citizens,” said May.

“It is especially important to recall this shameful blot on our history as the internment of refugees is again planned by the Harper Conservatives in Bill C-31,” said May.

Bill C-31, dubbed Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, has provisions that would see men and women and children 16-18 who come to Canada in an “irregular arrival” be interned for up to a year without review.

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1992—The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

The story starts 20 years ago with the over-arching climate treaty. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was negotiated between 1990 and 1992, and was signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (the ‘Earth Summit’).

Canada was the first industrialized country to both sign and ratify the UNFCCC, doing so in 1992. Signing is the easy part, usually done at a conference. Ratification is necessary for an international instrument to have legal force. It is typically conducted by a vote in a nation’s legislature.

In Canada, ratification can take place by a decision of the Privy Council (Cabinet). The UNFCCC ratification in 1992 was by Cabinet.

In the United States, ratification of treaties requires not only a vote in the Senate, but that it pass by a two-thirds vote. This additional Constitutional hurdle is why even when the US Senate has a Democratic majority, the Administration has not submitted Kyoto for ratification. However, the US did sign on to the UNFCCC under the Bush Administration, and the US Senate ratified it.

The Climate Change Threat—Assessment and Action

The UNFCCC confirms that climate change is a real threat. Its objective is ‘the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’

The difficulty, of course, is the word ‘dangerous.’ When does the additional loading of greenhouse gases from human activity (an amount far smaller than the beneficial natural levels) cease to be beneficial and become dangerous?

The answer to that comes through the guidance of another UN agency, one established for this purpose back in 1988. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is comprised of scientists appointed by governments. Their summary reports, Advice to Policy Makers, tackle this question. Whereas the danger level was once thought to be twice the pre-Industrial Revolution concentration of carbon dioxide (going from 275 parts per million to 550 ppm), the IPCC has constantly revised downward as evidence of danger comes into sharper relief.

The head of the IPCC has confirmed we should work to halt the global rise in GHG emissions such that by 2015, global emissions stop growing and begin to fall. The growing consensus is that emissions need to stabilize at 350 ppm, even though we are now at 390 ppm.
As well, the UNFCCC established the ‘precautionary principle’ which sets out:

‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.’

There are many other provisions within the UNFCCC, including calling on governments to both reduce emissions (‘mitigation’ in convention-speak) and adapt to those levels of climate change which are no longer avoidable (‘adaptation’).

What’s Missing

What the UNFCCC did not do was assign timelines and deadlines to the general promise to reduce emissions. Prior to the Rio Earth Summit,
former US President George HW Bush said that if the UNFCCC included deadlines and timetables he would refuse to attend the event, declaring, ‘The American lifestyle is not on trial.’

All countries have signed and ratified the UNFCCC, making them ‘parties’ to the agreement. Once enough countries had ratified to make the treaty enter into force, annual meetings called the Conference of the Parties (COP) began.

1997—The Kyoto Protocol

The third Conference of the Parties, COP3, under the UNFCCC was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan. Its goal was to bring forward the timeline and deadlines that had not been possible in Rio. There was optimism it would be possible to come to agreement. Optimism came from two events: the replacement of Bush with Clinton, and the success of a protocol to protect the ozone layer.

The Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer had been concluded in 1987, dealing with the Reagan Administration. (I was part of the Canadian team in Montreal. That’s another story, but I recall US Interior Secretary Don Hodell trying to block progress by saying we didn’t need to get rid of ozone-depleters. We only needed sunscreen and broad-brimmed hats!)

As early as 1995, at the first COP in Bonn, Germany, the model of the Montreal Protocol was mandated for the climate protocol. The Montreal Protocol had gotten all countries on Earth, rich and poor, to sign on.

The core principle was called ‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’

All countries agreed that as the problem had been caused by the wealthy industrialized countries, those countries would face specific time-limited commitments while the developing countries could actually increase their use of ozone depleters in the short term.

Once the industrialized world has demonstrated it’s bona fide (and developed the alternatives), the developing world takes on firm cuts as the agreement moves forward. The protocol also committed that parties would be influenced by the scientific advice as it changed.

The only significant difference between the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol was that the ozone agreement had effective enforcement mechanisms. If any party violated the protocol, other parties could bring trade sanctions against them. With the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995, and the mere questioning of whether environmental treaties might impede trade, Canada announced we would not sign any agreement in Kyoto that included trade sanctions. And we were not alone.

That failure is why there are no financial penalties should Canada stay in Kyoto and fail to meet targets.

Kyoto set out a combined set of firm emissions reductions that should have taken the industrialized world to 5.2% below 1990 levels by the end of this year. In fact, of those countries that made serious efforts, they collectively did reach the 5% goal. The EU, having committed to 8% reductions, actually hit a goal closer to 20% below.

But the United States under George W Bush reneged and never ratified. And, as we all know, the economies of China, India and Brazil grew enormously. Today, China is the world’s biggest polluter, but it is still a relatively small contributor to our existing problem. It only overtook the US as largest polluter recently.

Looking at the atmosphere as though it were a garbage dump (which is how we treat it), the overflowing mess from the last 100 years is still there. The mess from the last few years is certainly serious, but the industrialized world’s ‘historic’ pollution is not history. It operates every day to disrupt the climate we used to know.

As you know from the Durban updates in the past two editions of Island Tides, there is now a second commitment period under Kyoto. Without that commitment, China, India and Brazil made it clear they would not take on any hard and fast cuts down the road.

We need Kyoto. And we need to keep Canada in Kyoto. Under Article 27 (2) of the Kyoto Protocol, a party can file a legal intention to withdraw. It takes effect one year from the date it was received.

Canada is in Kyoto until December 2012. And we need public pressure to keep us there.

The post Making sense of climate agreements: a Kyoto Protocol primer appeared first on Elizabeth May.

When I wrote “Fact Check on Kyoto Distortions” on November 28, 2011 for my blog, I covered the most frequently cited, misleading/dishonest bits of spin on the subject. That blog covered the top 5, but now there are more. It’s time for “Fact Check on Kyoto Distortions—The Sequel.”

Distortion number six:  If Canada does not withdraw from Kyoto, we will owe billions in penalties.

Fact Check: Sadly, there are no effective compliance mechanisms under Kyoto.  There are no financial penalties.  I say “sadly” because effective compliance mechanisms were available to the negotiators in 1997.  The 1987 Montreal Protocol to protect the Ozone Layer had a great enforcement tool —  trade sanctions.

If any party to the Montreal Protocol on ozone were to violate its commitments to reduce and ultimately eliminate use of ozone-depleters, the other nations in the protocol could punish the offender with trade sanctions.  In 1995 the World Trade Organization was created.  Although there were no rulings on the matter, its Trade and Environment Committee raised the question of whether there were any environmental treaties that compromised trade, concluding that the enforcement mechanisms under the Montreal Protocol might violate the GATT.  By 1997 in Kyoto, Canada refused to sign onto any Protocol that included trade sanctions, as did many other countries.  This is why Kyoto’s enforcement mechanism is essentially a wet noodle. The only sanction is that in negotiating a second commitment period target, whatever amount of the first target that country missed, it would have to add an additional one third of a ton as penalty.  But since the target is individual to each country and since it is a product of negotiation, it would be easy enough to negotiate the next phase target in a way that anticipated the .3 ton top up.

So how does the Minister of Environment get away with saying something that is patently untrue?  He chooses his words carefully.  This is how Peter Kent explained it in a recent opinion piece in the Financial Post:

“The math is clear: The total number of carbon credits required multiplied by the average cost of a carbon credit is $14-billion. And the facts are simple: You cannot enter the second commitment period without completing the first, and we either pay the $14-billion or we would be in violation of the protocol.”

Kent is careful to say that the $14 billion is the cost of compliance. Hypothetically, if we were suddenly to decide we wanted to meet the 2012 target Prime Minister Stephen Harper repudiated back in 2006, when he cancelled all programmes to reach the Kyoto target, it would only be possible through buying credits.  Sure, it might cost the $14 billion Kent has claimed, but no one in their right mind would do that, and there is nothing in the Kyoto Protocol to force Canada to spend a dime.

Distortion number seven: “You cannot enter the second commitment period without completing the first.” (see Kent quote above)

Fact Check:  It certainly sounds logical, but it is not true.

There are two ways in which the statement can be interpreted and neither is true.

1. The first issue is the matter of staying in the Kyoto Protocol as a party, but not agreeing to second commitment period targets.  Japan and Russia are doing just that, but neither face penalties.  Japan is still hoping to hit its target, and is already below 1990 levels of emissions (while Canada is 28% above 1990 levels).  Japan is unlikely to hit its target, but has said it will stay in Kyoto, participating as a party.  It will be both out of compliance and refusing to take on second commitment period targets.  It will not face penalties because (see above), there are no penalties under Kyoto.  Canada is not the only Kyoto Party out of compliance; but we are the only country planning to legally withdraw.
2. The second way of framing Kent’s distortion is to say that Canada could not take on a new round of legally binding targets without first meeting the 6% below 1990 target by 2012 we legally obligated ourselves to meet under Kyoto.  This is also not true.  The targets in the second commitment period are a matter of negotiation.  To get Canada committed to new legally binding emission reductions, other countries would likely be accommodating.  As an example, back in 1997, Australia refused to sign onto Kyoto unless their target was 8% above 1990 levels, when all other industrialized countries were pledging to cutting below 1990 emission levels. Australia’s increase in emissions was allowed through negotiation.  There is nothing in the protocol that requires being in compliance with the first commitment period before negotiating the second.

Distortion number eight:  Canada has withdrawn from Kyoto.

Fact check:  Canada has filed a legal notice of intent to withdraw.  It will take legal effect in December 2012.  Until then, Canada is a Kyoto party.  Let’s cancel that letter and start being responsible global citizens.

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By some lights it was a breakthrough to have China and India and Brazil talking about targets — even though they have only agreed to start getting there.  It is an enormous relief to have a second commitment period under Kyoto, starting immediately at the end of the first. But Canada is, of course, refusing to take part, plus Japan and Russia.  The USA remains perpetually hobbled by domestic politics and somehow year after year and COP after COP, the US ducks its responsibilities.

Canada’s role, Fossil of the Year for the 5th consecutive year is no surprise. Canada’s interventions and actions have the effect of weakening texts and hardening positions. As I head home I am so worried about the reports that the Prime Minister wants to legally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. For all the damage we have done thus far, such an action would hurt the new agreements from Durban before the ink is dry.  We need to stay on top of this threat, reportedly to be executed on December 23.

The frustrating, maddening, even terrifying aspect of climate talks is that GHG levels keep rising while multilateral negotiations try to determine the time table by which they will be reduced. – eventually. It reminds me of the unacceptable negotiations with forest companies. We used to call it “talk and log.” The climate equivalent, climate negotiators talk while profligate use of fossil fuels ramps up year on year.

We need the equivalent of a cease fire.  No new GHG added, no new tar sands projects approved.  We cannot afford to keep adding an ever increasing volume of warming gases into the atmosphere, while negotiating when we plan to begin to slow it down.

And that is why we have to find a way to pick up the pace. We are risking putting the atmosphere on an irreversible trajectory to runaway global warming. We need to stop the rise in GHG — everywhere on Earth by 2015.  On current levels of political will, we are not yet close to the actions we need. Still, thank goodness Durban gave us something in the right direction. Now we need to get back to public mobilizations to improve the agreements and really reduce GHG.

The post Last thoughts on the Durban package appeared first on Elizabeth May.

In my last column for 2010, appearing on December 9, I wrote about the inspiring work of Canadian youth, using the example of pressing for climate action. Our young people were out in force in Cancun, Mexico for the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

They wore a powerful message on their T-shirts. It was a quote from Christina Ora, a young woman from the Solomon Islands, at last year’s COP: ‘You have been negotiating all my life. You cannot tell me you need more time.’

Now for the rest of the story.

After last year’s failure in Copenhagen, few held out any hopes for a good result in Cancun. The abuse and lack of trust in Copenhagen—the hijacking of negotiations to back-rooms by Barack Obama, the repeated insults to various delegations, particularly (and inexplicably) China by the host government, the rich country gambit that developing countries would take large amounts of money and look the other way as industrialized countries continue polluting—all led to a deep level of distrust as negotiations opened in Cancun.

By the time I arrived in Cancun on December 4, the atmosphere was gloomy. Initially there were rumours that the Mexican host was also working on a secret text, as Denmark had done last year. Prospects for success were dampened when Canada, Russia and Japan were named as countries unwilling to commit to a second phase of Kyoto. The mood was not optimistic.

At the mid-point in negotiations, Sunday, December 5, the president of the conference, Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Espinosa, convened an informal session of the plenary. Espinosa used that Sunday session for what amounted to a group therapy session. She set out how she planned to work over the remaining week, emphasizing repeatedly that she would not hold secret discussions. She explained that she was setting up a number of informal working groups on key issues, with co-chairs selected to pair a developing country with an industrialized country. While she was asking small groups to meet behind closed doors, risking comparisons to Copenhagen, she ensured that any country could join any meeting underway. Her repeated assurances of transparency and inclusiveness led to a remarkably cathartic discussion, with country after country calling for an exorcism of the ‘ghost of Copenhagen.’ That discussion seemed to shift the negotiations to a more constructive approach.

Still, progress was slow and sessions laboured in fragmented discussions, all off to the side. On the afternoon of the last day of the conference there was no sense of the dramatic events that were to unfold.

What we had not understood that: Mexican host Patricia Espinoza and Christiana Figueres, respected Costa Rican diplomat and new head of the United Nations FCCC Secretariat, had decided to try something novel (and risky). As each sub-group made progress, whereever consensus appeared, comprehensive draft language was prepared and distributed—fifty nations were in direct consultation around the emerging, consensual text.

Last Minute Surprise

Finally, in the afternoon of that last day, two texts were released. One dealt with the future for Kyoto, the other with the so-called ‘Long-term Cooperative Action’ (LCA) issues. In total over 30 pages of detailed text. The text had something for everyone. If accepted, everyone would have to give a little ground.

The two draft texts had been distributed and delegations were the mood of the room was clear. Espinoza was greeted by a prolonged, emotional, standing ovation. Work continued through the night, indeed until 6:30 the next morning. But the enthusiasm for the text was shared, nearly universally.

Only Bolivia registered its objections. Canada clearly didn’t like the text, but Canada was not going to block what was a widespread consensus. (I spoke with acting Environment Minister John Baird just as the plenary resumed at 9pm. He told me Canada had lots of problems with the agreement, and if the text was opened up, it would not survive.)

What Was Agreed?

The documents do not by themselves obligate governments to take any new steps to reduce emissions. What they do is build a strong foundation for agreements to be reached at COP17 next year in Durban, South Africa.

The language is strong and unequivocal. In the LCA decision it is stated ‘climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet, and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties.’

The decisions confirm that the science and IPCC advice is compelling. It commits to find ways to avoid allowing global average temperature from increasing by 2oC, but recognizes the need to consider that the high point should be 1.5oC. For the first time in a UN decision, it mandates that all nations should immediately determine the year by which GHG emissions should peak and begin to fall. It states all parties agree ‘that Parties should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national greenhouse gas emissions as industrialized countries should reduce emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020.

It deals extensively with the need for adaptation (creating a Cancun Adaptation Framework and Adaptation committee), for financing, it creates a new Green Climate Fund, as well as funding to help arrest deforestation.

What Does It Mean?

It means Kyoto is still alive, but the parties are not committed to a second commitment period when Kyoto’s first period ends in 2012. It just means there could be a second commitment period. Anchoring of voluntary pledges from the Copenhagen Accord may fit into the language of the LCA text, but the Copenhagen Accord targets are laughably weak. Hence, the language calling for industrialized countries to ‘raise the level of ambition’ in their targets.

Somehow in Durban at COP17 we will have to find a way to either continue this two-track process (Kyoto and FCCC) or merge them in one agreement.

What Can Canadians Do?

Once again, our government won the Colossal Fossil Award for being the most obstructive nation in the negotiations. Before Durban, we have to get a change in our government’s position, or get a new government. Canada stepping up to commit to a second commitment period, even on weaker targets, could help shift the balance to saving Kyoto. The bottom line is that we are running out of time. In the next 12 months, we must seize the small ripples of hope that are emanating from Cancun. We must build a public demand for real action to bring the words and framework of the Cancun agreements to life.

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